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COMMODITIES LAW: INVESTOR PROTECTION OR
ABANDONMENT?.
DONALD C. SHINE*
Chicago has long been the center of the multibillion dollar com-
modity futures trading industry.' It is not surprising then that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has consistently
served as a major source of decisional law on the subject. The 1977-78
term,2 in which five significant commodities law decisions were an-
nounced, was no exception. While the court decided distinct, if not
narrow issues in each case, two general judicial viewpoints emerged.
First, commodity futures trading accounts, even those where discretion
to trade the account is given to the broker or his representative, are not
cognizable as "securities" under securities laws. Consequently, relief
under the securities laws will be denied.3 Second, federal courts, par-
ticularly those within the Seventh Circuit, will accord great deference
to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 4 on matters within
the ambit of CFTC action.5 This article will discuss the Seventh Cir-
cuit's commodities decisions by focusing on the court's reasoning and
analyzing the results.
DISCRETIONARY COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING ACCOUNTS ARE
NOT SECURITIES
Perhaps of most significance to the commodity law practitioner is
Hirk v. Agri-Research Council Inc. 6 In Hirk, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit faced the issue of whether a discre-
* Partner, Howington, Elworth, Osswald & Hough; J.D., Loyola University of Chicago;
member of the Illinois bar.
1. Three of the nation's four volume-leading futures exchanges are located in Chicago: The
Board of Trade of the City of Chicago; The Chicago Mercantile Exchange; and The Mid-America
Commodity Exchange.
2. The scope of this article will be limited to cases decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit between September 1977 and August 1978.
3. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
4. Hereinafter referred to as CFTC.
5. Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1978); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leba-
non) S.A.L., 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978); Silverman v. CFTC,
562 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1977).
6. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977). Agri-Research Council, Inc. will hereinafter be referred to as
ARCO.
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tionary commodity futures trading account can ever fall within the
United States Supreme Court's definition of an investment contract as
a species of securities under the federal securities laws.
Since the early seventies there has been substantial authority on
both sides of this issue. The Seventh Circuit7 and district courts in the
Third8 and Ninth9 Circuits have held that such accounts are not securi-
ties. The courts' rationale is that these accounts lack the element of
"common enterprise" required by SEC v. WJ Howey Co. ,10 because
they do not involve a pooling of investors' funds. In contrast, the
Fifth,"l Eighth,12 and Tenth 13 Circuits, as well as a district court in the
Second Circuit' 4 have held that such accounts are securities. After
carefully reconsidering the question in Hirk, the Seventh Circuit deliv-
ered the clear message that neither a discretionary commodity account
nor trading therein is cognizable as a "security" under federal securities
laws. 15
The original complaint in Hirk was filed in May 1974.16 The five-
count amended complaint was conscientiously drafted with an eye to-
7. See Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 887 (1972).
8. See Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61, 64-65 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Wasnowic v. Chi-
cago Board of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'drment, 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir.
1973).
9. See Stuckey v. du Pont Glore Forgan, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 129, 131-32 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
10. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11. See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 561, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1974).
12. See Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970).
13. See Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39, 42 (10th Cir. 1973).
14. See Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
15. In the past, complaints brought by disappointed commodities futures account holders
customarily alleged violations of the federal securities laws in addition to claims under the Com-
modity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1970) (amended 1974). See, e.g., Frashcilla v. James T.
McKerr & Co., No. 75C 1927 (N.D. IU. Nov. 5, 1975); Stevens v. Woodstock, Inc., 372 F. Supp.
654 (N.D. IIl. 1974); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1970), afftd,
457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). This practice was prompted in part by
the absence of an express provision in the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1970)
(amended 1974), authorizing private civil actions for damages. In addition, not all commodities,
e.g., silver, were covered by the Act. While courts generally found an implied federal action if a
particular commodity was regulated by the Act, the "loophole" for non-regulated commodities
remained. See, e.g., Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1973); Goodman v. H.
Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967) and cases cited therein. The amendment of the
Commodity Exchange Act by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.), still does not give an express
right of private action, but it does bring all commodities traded on commodity futures exchanges
within the Act's jurisdiction. Thus, while the securities law aspects of Hirk should be of substan-
tial interest to the commodities law practitioner, it should be anticipated that as long as there
remains the least doubt as to the Act's jurisdiction, attorneys are likely to include securities law
claims in their complaints, particularly in other circuits. For an insightful discussion of the securi-
ties claims in Hirk see Roche & Zwirner, Securities Law.- Seventh Circuit Review of Remedies,
Defiions, Standing, and Sanctions Under the Securities Laws, 55 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 203, 210-17
(1978).
16. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
94,738 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 1974), affdinpart, rev'din part, 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
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ward earlier case law on the subject. The first count alleged violations
of the Securities Act of 1933,'7 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.18
Hirk alleged that pursuant to a written agreement he opened a dis-
cretionary commodity futures trading account with ARCO, that he de-
posited margin funds and that thereafter commodity futures trades
were executed for him by ARCO's vice-president under a written
power of attorney. Hirk also alleged and detailed various misrepresen-
tations made by the defendants during the solicitation of the account. 19
It was Hirk's contention that his discretionary account agreement and
the power of attorney together constituted an "investment contract" or
64a certificate of interest or participation in [a] profit sharing agreement"
and, thus, constituted a "security" within the meaning of the federal
securities laws.20
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.2' The motion asserted: (1)
that discretionary commodity trading accounts were not securities
within the meaning of federal securities laws; (2) that the alleged con-
duct was not subject to the provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act;
and, (3) that assuming dismissal of the federal claims, pendent state
claims should be dismissed as there would be no basis for jurisdiction
over the state law claims in the absence of diversity.
The district court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. In
reaching his decision on the securities laws claims,22 Judge Decker
placed principal reliance on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Milnarik
v. M-S Commodities, Inc. ,23 a factually similar case in which Judge
Stevens24 had carefully considered related issues.25 Judge Decker then
found that "the touchstone of an investment contract"-the element of
17. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976).
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b(1), c(1O) (1976). The complaint also alleged violations of the Commod-
ity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1970) (amended 1974), the Illinois Securities Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 121 1/2, § 137, 2-1 (1977), and state laws proscribing fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. 561
F.2d at 98 n.l.
19. 561 F.2d at 98.
20. Id. at 99.
21. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
22. For a discussion of the commodities law claims see text accompanying notes 45-54 infra.
23. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
24. Now Justice Stevens.
25. Judge Decker also adopted the position taken by most courts and found that "there is no
real distinction between investment contracts and profit-sharing plans." He thus decided that a
finding as to the existence of an investment contract would control a finding regarding the exist-
ence of a profit sharing plan. 11974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 94,738 at
96,453.
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"common enterprise"-was absent in Hirk.26 The court's analysis is
concisely stated:
There is no claim that defendants pooled the funds of the separate
investors. The contractual agreement between the parties makes no
reference to any proposed commingling of funds or a joint account
with other investors, but speaks solely in terms of a single account,
limited to plaintiff's investment. Further, although defendants may
have entered into similar discretionary arrangements with other in-
vestors, there is no suggestion that the success or failure of those
other contracts directly affected the profitability of plaintiff's invest-
ment. . . .Nor are there sufficient allegations that plaintiff and the
other customers were "joint participants in the same investment en-
terprise." . . . The pleadings here simply do not suggest any relevant
distinction between this case and Milnarik pointing to the existence
of a "common enterprise" here that did not exist in Minarik.
27
Granted leave to amend, Hirk amplified the allegations concern-
ing the pooling of investors' funds. However, the district court again
dismissed the complaint in June 1976, apparently without further opin-
ion. 2
8
On appeal Hirk reasserted that his arrangement with the defend-
ants constituted an "investment contract" and thus qualified as a secur-
ity. He contended that the "touchstone" element of "common
enterprise" found lacking in his original complaint was sufficiently al-
leged in his amended complaint. Specifically, he pointed out that the
amended complaint alleged that the defendants treated all the discre-
tionary accounts carried by them in the same manner and consequently
he shared pro rata with the other accounts "as if' all the funds had
been commingled. He further claimed that his investment monies were
misused by the defendants to finance ARCO's operating expenses and
attract other investors to their scheme. 2
9
The Seventh Circuit and the parties in Hirk agreed that the court's
earlier decision in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc. 30 was of extreme
precedential value and would control unless overturned or distin-
guished. Accordingly, the court undertook a rather thorough re-exami-
nation of Milnarik and its genesis, SEC v. .J Howey Co. 31
In Howey the United States Supreme Court provided what has be-
come the traditional definition of an investment contract. Briefly, the
Court dealt with the question of whether the sale of land in a citrus
26. Id.
27. Id. (footnote by the court and citations omitted).
28. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1977).
29. Id. at 99.
30. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
31. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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grove, with a lease-back to the developer, constituted the sale of an
investment contract. The Court held that it did. Speaking through Jus-
tice Murphy, the Court stated, "[Ain investment contract for purposes
of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party .... 32
It is the common enterprise element of this test which has pro-
voked the greatest degree of controversy among the lower courts in
subsequent decisions. 33 While the term "common enterprise" has been
reiterated by the Supreme Court as a criterion of investment contract in
subsequent cases,3 4 the Court has not provided further insight into the
concept of common enterprise or its components.
Unfortunately, Hirk does not prescribe definitive elements of com-
mon enterprise either. Instead, it provides a re-assessment of the Sev-
enth Circuit's earlier position in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.,35
in the wake of other circuits' subsequent decisions to the contrary.
In Milnarik, the Seventh Circuit concluded that discretionary
commodity trading accounts were not investment contracts under
Howey. The court reasoned that the investors did not expect profits
from the operation of all the discretionary accounts managed by their
common broker but rather from their individual trading accounts with-
out reference to the others. Thus, the Howey "common enterprise" test
was not met.36 Milnarik was thereafter construed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in SEC v. Continental Commodi-
ties Corp. ,37 to require a pooling of investors' funds. In the Fifth Cir-
cuit's view the critical factor is whether or not "the fortunes of all
investors are inextricably tied" to the success of the investment enter-
prise.38 By the same token the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected what it
concluded to be the Seventh Circuit's criterion, i e., a pooling of inves-
tors' funds or pro rata distribution of profits.
39
Rejecting the view espoused by the Fifth Circuit and the line of
cases it represents,40 and subsuming that Judge Stevens had read
Howey as requiring a pooling of investors' funds, the Hirk court re-
32. Id. at 298-99.
33. See text accompanying notes 7-14 supra.
34. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 72 n.13 (1959).
35. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
36. Id at 276-78.
37. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Ci. 1974).
38. Id at 522 (quoting SEC v. Kosco Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 499 (5th Cir. 1974)).
39. 497 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1974).
40. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
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fused to overturn Minarik or to distinguish the facts presented in Hirk
from the dictates of Milnarik.4' Having reached these conclusions the
Hirk court quickly dispatched the plaintiff's contentions by stating:
It is obvious that the amended complaint is insufficient on its face to
satisfy the pooling requirements. "As if commingled" is not the same
as commingled. Furthermore, each discretionary trading account is
unitary in nature; each account has a success or failure rate without
regard to the others. Hirk's effort to sidestep this fact by stressing in
paragraph 6 that substantially similar transactions were made in all
accounts and that profits or losses ebbed or flowed uniformly also
fails because the necessary pooling remains unshown.
42
The court also declined to accept Hirk's invitation to "re-examine
Milnarik in terms of the remedial purpose of the [securities] Acts. .
since in its estimation the Milnarik court had already done so.
43
Superficially, Hirk, in reaffirming the Seventh Circuit's earlier de-
cision in Milnarik, ripens the issue of whether discretionary commodity
futures trading accounts qualify as securities for Supreme Court re-
view."4 Short of a Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject, a
conflict among the circuits will continue to exist. However, it must be
noted that the other principal aspect of the Hirk decision may well ob-
viate any otherwise compelling need for the Supreme Court to review
the securities law question.
The district court dismissed Hirk's commodities law count as well
as the securities law count. Fundamentally, the district court based its
dismissal on a distinction between fraud in the inducement in establish-
ing the account and fraud attending the trading of the account. Judge
Decker held that fraud in the inducement was not actionable. The
court interpreted section 4(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act,45 as
proscribing only conduct related to the purchase of a commodity fu-
41. 561 F.2d at 101.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 101-02.
44. See Sup. CT. R. 19(b) which sets forth considerations governing review on certiorari.
Conflict among the courts of appeals on the same matter is one such consideration.
45. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market, or... agent,. .. of any
member, in or in connection with any order to make, or the making of, any contract of
sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, made. . . for or on behalf of any other
person, or (2) for any person, in or in connection with any order to make, or the making
of, any contract of sale of any commodity for future delivery, made. . . for or on behalf
of any other person...
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false report or
statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person any
false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means
whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or execution of
any such order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with respect
to such order or contract for such person .... (Emphasis added.)
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tures contract or in reporting to a customer the status of the contract or
trading.46 The district court then construed the complaint as alleging
fraudulent conduct in connection with the solicitation of the account
rather than fraud in trading the account and held that no claim was
stated under the Act.
47
It should have come as no surprise to the district court that the
Seventh Circuit branded its interpretation of the Act as "narrow.
48
On review, the court of appeals cited the Act's pertinent provisions,
49
related provisions,50 and legislative history.5 1 After making special
note of the "or in connection with" language of the Act, the Seventh
Circuit stated that "[tihe plain meaning of such broad language [in the
Act] cannot be ignored. '52
The Seventh Circuit's resounding reversal on the commodities law
count can and perhaps should be construed not as a reproval of a high-
ly respected district court judge, but rather a tacit endorsement of bas-
ing commodities claims on the commodities laws. Certainly, the
characterization of the Act's "in connection with" language as "broad"
coupled with the finding that the Act was designed "to eliminate
'[clertain trade practices involving the cheating of customers . .' -53 is
a broad interpretation of the Act, at least with regard to "investor" 54
protection.
GREAT DEFERENCE IS ACCORDED THE CFTC BY THE COURTS
Registration Revocation
In Silverman v. CFTC,55 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reviewed the CFTC's revocation of Silverman's 1i-
46. [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,738 at 96,454.
47. Id.
48. 561 F.2d at 104. In his June 1974 opinion, which was the basis for the ultimate dismissal
by the district court on June 28, 1976, Judge Decker acknowledged that the complaint alleged
fraud concerning the handling of the account and trading therein but found that the allegations
were not set forth with sufficient particularity and were otherwise infirm. [1974-75 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,738 at 96,455. Apparently, at least according to the Sev-
enth Circuit, the defects were cured by amendment; however, the district court unaccountably
failed to reconsider the amended version. See 561 F.2d at 103.
49. Id. at 103-04.
50. Id. at 104.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing S. REp. No. 1431, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935)).
54. The term "investor"1 may be a misnomer since trading in commodity futures is univer-
sally regarded as highly speculative. See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1976).
55. 562 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1977).
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cense to do business on commodity futures markets. The opinion rep-
resents an instructive description of the CFTC's jurisdictional base,
regulatory mission and broad authority. It also provides a painstaking
rendition of the procedural framework and development of the case at
bar. However, the most noteworthy aspect of the case is not what it
says, but what it does not say. In the last analysis, doubt remains as to
whether Silverman was accorded fundamentally fair treatment by the
CFTC, for, as will be shown, Silverman was twice punished by the
CFTC for the same conduct.
Silverman was an "associated person" by regulatory definition 56
and an account executive or "customers' man" for a futures com-
mission merchant (commodity futures broker) by description. On
March 13, 1973, the United States Secretary of Agriculture 57 charged
Silverman with unauthorized and fraudulent trading of customers' ac-
counts on specified occasions during September and October 1970 and
in March 1972. On May 5, 1976, the CFTC58 found Silverman guilty
as charged and issued its order prohibiting him from trading his ac-
count or anyone else's account on any exchange for a period of two
years.59 In addition, Silverman was ordered to permanently cease and
desist from placing unauthorized or fraudulent customer orders.60
It must also be noted that the CFTC's "Final Order" reduced the
administrative law judge's recommended five-year suspension period to
a period of two years. In doing so the CFTC stated:
In view of the registration requirements of the Act which will require
the respondent to file an application for registration as an associated
person of a futures commission merchant under Section 4k of the
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6k, in order to be employed as an account executive
with a futures commission merchant, the Commission believes that a
five-year sanction prohibiting the respondent from trading on any
contract market, is excessive on the facts of this case.6'
On appeal the Seventh Circuit, on February 16, 1977, affirmed the
56. 7 U.S.C. § 6k (1976) requires registration of an "associated person" who is "any person
* .. associated with any futures commission merchant or with any agent of a futures commission
merchant as a partner, officer, or employee... in any capacity which involves (i) the solicitation
or acceptance of customers' orders. . . or (ii) the supervision of any person or persons so en-
gaged .... "
57. The Secretary of Agriculture was the CFTC's regulatory predecessor.
58. The CFTC was established pursuant to an amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act.
Under this amendment, all then pending cases, including Silverman's, were transferred to the
CFTC. See 7 U.S.C. § 4a, note (1976).
59. In re Silverman, [1975-77 Transfer Binder] CoMm. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,159 (CFTC
No. 75-6 May 5, 1976), afd.rub, nomL Silverman v. CFTC, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 20,974.
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CFTC's order suspending Silverman.62 Silverman apparently com-
plied with the suspension order and normally it could be expected that
his troubles with the CFTC would end here. However, from his stand-
point the worst was yet to come.
Two days after the commencement of the suspension period the
CFTC, on May 27, 1976, issued a rule to show cause why his registra-
tion as an associated person ought not be revoked. The grounds as-
serted in the rule were the same as those charged in the first case along
with the recital that Silverman had been found guilty in the first case.
Moreover, in the second case the CFTC again proceeded against
Silverman pursuant to the provisions of section 4b of the Act,63 as it
had done in the first action. The only discernible difference between
the two cases is that the CFTC was seeking revocation of Silverman's
registration in the later case whereas it sought suspension of trading
privileges in the earlier case.
Registered commodity representatives were not required to regis-
ter with the federal government, at the time that charges were first
lodged against Silverman. It was not until April 21, 1975, the effective
date of the amended Commodity Exchange Act, that they were re-
quired to register.64 Apparently, the CFTC relied on this factor as jus-
tification for doing what it did. Yet, it should be noted that Silverman
did register as required, and in so doing specified the pendency of the
CFTC's charges.65 Further, the CFTC accepted his application and
permitted Silverman's registration and its renewal without comment or
qualification. And it is particularly significant that while the matter
pended before the CFTC for one year, the CFTC never sought to
amend the charges also pending in the first case to include a prayer for
registration revocation. Further, because the first case resulted in a
final valid judgment, the second action could have been barred by res
judicata.66
The CFTC's failure to amend its original charge is not justified or
explained in the reported accounts of the second case.67 Moreover, the
62. Silverman v. CFTC, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977), qf'g In re Silverman, [1975-77 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,159 (CFTC No. 75-6 May 5, 1976).
63. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976).
64. Id. §§ 6f, 6k.
65. 562 F.2d at 433.
66. Under the doctrine of res judicata a final valid judgment on the merits precludes further
litigation of the same cause of action between the same parties or those in privity with them. See
Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955); 1B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.401 at 11 (2d ed. 1974).
67. See Silverman v. CFTC, 562 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Silverman, (1975-77 Transfer
Binder] COMM. FuT. L. R P. (CCH) 20,410 (N.D. Ili. March 14, 1977); In re Silverman, [1975-77
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,205 (CFTC No. 76-18 Aug. 24, 1976).
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decision of the CFTC administrative law judge in the second case
evinces that Silverman urged that the second action was barred. In the
introductory clause to his Findings of Fact the administrative law judge
observed:
The 1974 changes in the Act clearly show a change of legislative pol-
icy in policing commodity market practices and the fact, standing
alone, that this proceeding involves a revised statute is a proper basis
for rejecting a claim that the final order in No. 75-6 is a bar to this
proceeding.
68
An accompanying footnote referred to two cases which purport-
edly supported the finding that the second action against Silverman
was not barred. The two cases are Pacrfc Seafarers v. Pacofc Far East
Line,69 and Thompson v. Flemming.70 Neither case supports the thesis
of the administrative law judge.
The Paco/c Seafarers case concerned the applicability of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act7 to an alleged conspiracy between defend-
ant American shipping lines and two conferences to which they be-
longed. The complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to destroy
the plaintiff's business of carrying certain cargoes. Unlike Silverman,
Pacific Seafarers did not involve "a revised statute" as a proper basis
for refusing to apply the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estop-
pel.7
2
The only reference to collateral estoppel in Paciic Seafarers is in-
apposite to Silverman. The defendants in Pacfic Seafarers pointed to
an earlier determination by the Federal Maritime Commission in a
case involving the same parties in a similar action under another fed-
eral statute. The defendants then urged that the prior determination
ought to bar relitigation of whether "foreign commerce" cognizable
under federal laws was present in the action. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia rejected the defendants' urging. After observ-
ing that the Commission action had been brought under the Shipping
Act,73 whereas the federal court action had been brought under the
Sherman Act, the court found that "[t]he commission did not rule that
there was no 'foreign commerce' as that term is used in the Sherman
Act, nor did it rule that the standards under the two acts were the
68. [1975-77 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REp. (CCH) 1 20,205 at 21,127-28.
69. 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1970).
70. 188 F. Supp. 123 (D. Or. 1960).
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
72. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit "pre-
cludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the prior suit, regardless of
whether it was based on the same cause of action as the second suit." Lawlor v. National Screen
Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
73. 46 U.S.C. §§ 814, 815 First, 817 (1970).
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same." 74
In contrast to Pacic Seafarers, Silverman did not invoke defini-
tional differences between two acts or even within the same act. Rather
it concerned two separate impositions of sanctions by an administrative
agency for the same conduct. This matter simply was not addressed or
even alluded to in Pac#Fc Seafarers. Hence, Pacic Seafarers does not
support the result in Silverman.
Similarly, Thompson v. Flemming,75 the other case cited by the ad-
ministrative law judge in Silverman, did not involve a "revised statute"
or an attempt to bar a second action under the same Act. Thompson
was a case involving the Social Security Administration's denial of dis-
ability insurance benefits. The Social Security Administration had de-
termined that Thompson did not have an irremediable impairment
which would preclude all forms of substantial gainful activity; thus, he
was not eligible for disability insurance benefits.76 In the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon, Thompson maintained that
the Veterans' Administration's finding that his disability prevented him
from engaging in substantial gainful employment ought to bind the
federal government. The court rejected Thompson's contention and in
so doing adopted the language of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in NLRB v. Pacfic Intermountain Express Co.77 The court
found that "[elach fact-finding agency is entitled to make its own deci-
sion upon the evidence before it and the fact that another tribunal has
reached a different conclusion upon the same issue. . . does not invali-
date any decision which has proper evidentiary support. 78
In contrast, Silverman involved only one "fact-finding agency,"
the CFTC. Accordingly, it would again appear that the Thompson case
is inapposite to Silverman and it may be that it was error not to bar the
second administrative action in Silverman. It must be recalled that the
CFTC's first order suspended Silverman for two years from trading
any accounts-both accounts in his own name and customers' ac-
counts--on any and all commodity exchanges. As a practical matter
this first preclusion encompasses the registration revocation imposed in
the second administrative action. And to permit a broader sanction,
74. 404 F.2d at 810.
75. 188 F. Supp. 123 (D. Or. 1960).
76. Id. at 125-26. See the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1976) for the current eligi-
bility requirements for disability insurance benefits.
77. 228 F.2d 170 (8th Cir. 1955).
78. 188 F. Supp. at 126 (quoting NLRB v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 228 F.2d 170,
176 (8th Cir. 1955)).
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viz., blanket registration revocation, in a second action could be con-
strued as overreaching.
In summary, it appears that, notwithstanding the propriety of pro-
cedural technicalities and nuances, Silverman was substantially
prejudiced by the second imposition of a harsher sanction for conduct
for which sanctions had already been imposed. Principles of res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel may properly be applied in administrative
cases.79 When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity
and resolves disputed factual issues which are properly before it and
which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the
courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.80
Moreover, the record in Silverman does not disclose a discernible rea-
son for the Seventh Circuit's failure to consider res judicata, collateral
estoppel or equitable estoppel in its decision.
ARBITRATION OF CUSTOMER-BROKER DISPUTES
The next two cases, Tamari v. Bache & Co.,"1 and Tamari v.
Conrad,82 are related. They concern the arbitration of customer-bro-
ker disputes arising out of the solicitation and handling of customers'
commodity futures trading accounts.8 3 The factual underpinnings of
both cases are basically the same.
In May and again in September 1972, the Tamaris executed cus-
tomer's agreements for the establishment of two commodity futures
trading accounts with Bache & Co.8 4 Thereafter, both accounts were
traded in futures contracts. It was then that the underlying dispute
arose.
On January 9, 1974, Bache Delaware served notarial notice upon
the Tamaris in Lebanon demanding arbitration of a $375,000 indebted-
ness caused by trading in the account. The arbitration demand was
predicated on Bache Delaware's customer's agreement which required
arbitration of all customer-broker disputes.8 5
79. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966); Sunshine An-
thracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1940). See also 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW §§ 18.01-.10 (1958).
80. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966).
81. 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
82. 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977).
83. The author appeared as counsel in the Tamari cases and the underlying dispute is still
pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in two other
related cases. Accordingly, while an attempt has been made to avoid commentary, the author's
view of these decisions must be read with this factor in mind.
84. Hereinafter referred to as Bache Delaware.
85. 552 F.2d at 779.
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The Tamaris replied to the notarial notice, agreed to arbitration as
required by the customer's agreement and also requested that the arbi-
tration proceedings include the Tamaris' counterclaim for $2,150,000
which they had paid to Bache Delaware and Bache & Co. (Lebanon)
S.A.L.86 As a result of this exchange, in April 1974 the Tamaris and
Bache Delaware executed a submission agreement for arbitration of the
dispute before a panel of the arbitration committee of the Chicago
Board of Trade.
8 7
For a variety of reasons evidentiary hearings before the CBOT ar-
bitration panel were not scheduled to begin until December 11, 1975.
On December 10, 1975, the Tamaris filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against both Bache
Lebanon and Bache Delaware, pursuant to the Commodity Exchange
Act.88 The complaint sought damages for various alleged wrongdoings
in connection with the solicitation and handling of the accounts. On
December 11, 1975, the arbitration panel met over the Tamaris' objec-
tions and, proceeding with the arbitration, began to receive evidence.89
The arbitration panel then scheduled the next hearing for early Janu-
ary 1976.
Shortly prior to the next scheduled arbitration hearing the Tamaris
filed an action in the district court, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration
Act.90 This action sought to prevent the CBOT and Bache Delaware
from proceeding with the arbitration, pending disposition of their fed-
eral damage suit under the Commodity Exchange Act. The district
court dismissed the injunction action on the ground that it failed to
state a cause of action for which relief might be granted.9' On appeal,
the judgment of the district court was affirmed by a divided court.92
Several issues were raised on appeal. Most of the issues were
unique to the facts of the case and are not likely to recur.93 However,
two issues of considerable potential significance were treated. The first
issue has two prongs, ie., whether section 7a(l 1) of the Commodity
Exchange Act,94 operated to bar the arbitration and whether Wilko v.
86. Hereinafter referred to as Bache Lebanon.
87. 552 F.2d at 779-80; 565 F.2d at 1200, 1203. The Chicago Board of Trade will hereinafter
be referred to as CBOT.
88. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17, 18-22 (1976).
89. 565 F.2d at 1203.
90. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
91. 565 F.2d at 1197.
92. Id. at 1194.
93. Id. at 1199.
94. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(l 1) (1976) provides that each commodities contract shall:
Provide a fair and equitable procedure through arbitration or otherwise for the settle-
ment of customers' claims and grievances against any member or employee thereof; pro-
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Swan,95 a securities case, applied by analogy to commodities cases and
thereby precluded arbitration.
With regard to the applicability of section 7a(1 1) of the Commod-
ity Exchange Act, the Tamaris interpreted that section as prohibiting
arbitration of claims exceeding $15,000. Because Bache's claim and
Tamari's counterclaim each exceeded that limit, Tamari contended that
the dispute could not be arbitrated.96 Conversely, Bache Delaware did
not interpret section 7a(l 1) as prohibiting arbitration of claims exceed-
ing $15,000 or precluding contract markets 97 from providing other arbi-
tration facilities. This was also the view of the CFTC.
98
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted Bache Delaware's
interpretation of section 7a( 11). The court also found that because the
arbitration proceedings were already pending on the effective date of
section 7a( 11), they were subject to the "broad saving provision" of
section 4a, note.99 Thus, the court held that the pending arbitration
was not prohibited by the Act.1°°
The other prong of the Tamaris' contention was that the teachings
of the Supreme Court barring arbitration in Wiko v. Swan'0 l ought to
be adopted by the Seventh Circuit. In Wiko the Court held that a
customer-broker securities account agreement to arbitrate any dispute
that may arise in the future is void under section 14 of the Securities
Act of 1933,102 notwithstanding the provision of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act 10 3 to the contrary. Section 14 of the Securities Act provides
that "any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person ac-
quiring a security to waive compliance with any provision of this sub-
chapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be
void."104 Simply stated, the Court in Wilko construed section 14 in
vided, [tihat (i) the use of such procedure by a customer shall be voluntary, (ii) the
procedure shall not be applicable to any claim in excess of $15,000, (iii) the procedure
shall not result in any compulsory payment except as agreed upon between the parties,
and (iv) the term "customer" as used in this paragraph shall not include a futures com-
mission merchant or a floor broker ....
95. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
96. 565 F.2d at 1199.
97. A contract market is an exchange or board of trade where futures contracts are traded.
See 565 F.2d at 1200 n.7. See a/so 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 8 (1976).
98. 565 F.2d at 1200.
99. Id. at 1201. The saving provision, section 4a, note, of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act, the amendatory act, provides: "Pending proceedings under existing law shall not
be abated by reason of any provision of this Act but shall be disposed of pursuant to the applica-
ble provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, in effect prior to the effective date of
this Act." 7 U.S.C. § 4a, note (1976).
100. 565 F.2d at 1201.
101. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976).
103. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1976).
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light of the congressional policy to protect the public and found that
the arbitration agreement was void.
0 5
The Tamaris asserted that by analogy Wilko applied to their case
due to the similarity in congressional intent underlying the enactment
of the federal securities laws and the commodities laws, i e., the protec-
tion of the investing public.' °6 The Seventh Circuit simply declined to
apply Wilko. It first noted that the Commodity Exchange Act contains
no provision comparable to section 14. It then distinguished the only
other then published opinion on the subject, Milani v. Conti Commodity
Services. 0 7 Finally, the court stated, "In any event we decline to legis-
late a Section 14 provision into the Commodities Act."' 0
It should be noted, however, that within two months of the deci-
sion in Tamari v. Bache, the Second Circuit decided Ames v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.'09 which did bar arbitration in a
similar situation. In Ames a commodity customer brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. The defendant
broker moved to stay the action pending arbitration pursuant to a
predispute customer agreement between the parties. In reversing the
district court's grant of an order compelling arbitration, the Second
Circuit retroactively applied pertinent provisions of the Commodity
Exchange Act" 0 and regulations promulgated thereunder by the
CFTC. The court reasoned that "[a] court must apply the law as it
exists at the time of its decision, even where the law has changed during
the pendency of the action, unless the statute or legislative history
reveals an intention of prospective application only, or retroactive ap-
plication would lead to 'manifest injustice.""' In view of Ames and a
later decision 12 and because Tamari v. Bache was not a unanimous
decision, it is possible that the Seventh Circuit may reexamine its posi-
tion if the issue of retroactivity is again presented.' '
3
The other significant aspect of Tamari v. Bache is treated in the
dissent of Judge Swygert. He found that "[tihe crucial issue in this case
105. 346 U.S. at 435.
106. See also Ames v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir.
1977); Rothberg v. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 445 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
107. [1975-77 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,227 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1976).
108. 565 F.2d at 1200.
109. 567 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1977).
110. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17, 18-22 (1976).
111. 567 F.2d at 1177 (citing Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).
112. Rothberg v. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., 445 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
113. The likelihood that retroactive application of the amended Commodity Exchange Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 1-17, 18-22 (1976) will be considered again is diminished with the passage of time since
it is increasingly unlikely that pre-1975 claims will be presented.
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is whether [Tamaris] should be compelled to comply with the agree-
ment to arbitrate disputes which was part of the contracts [they] signed
upon opening two accounts with Bache.""14 The Tamaris had con-
tended that the account agreements containing the provision to arbi-
trate all disputes amounted to contracts of adhesion and were thereby
unenforceable.
Judge Swygert agreed. He found that one of the primary purposes
behind the anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act" 15
was to protect the public from being cheated by "sophisticated insid-
ers." 1 6 Because of this legislative intent, Judge Swygert felt that the
Tamaris' complaint charging Bache with fraud should not be dismissed
on the basis of an adhesion contract drafted by Bache. To compel arbi-
tration in such a case was to force individual investors like the Tamaris
to take their grievances against a broker before a panel of other bro-
kers. Judge Swygert eloquently argued against this practice, stating:
We can be confident that, if the commodities brokers as a class can
compel the arbitration of anti-fraud claims rather than litigating
them in court, they will do so. The arbitrators before whom the com-
plaints would be filed would also be insiders in the commodities in-
dustry, and would tend to be more tolerant of questionable practices
by brokers than would a judge who is an outsider to the field. But
the individual investor is entitled to have his claim decided by an
outsider. It contravenes the spirit of the Act and undermines its re-
medial purposes to remand the investor who contends a broker has
committed fraud to a committee composed of other brokers on the
basis of an arbitration clause in an adhesion contract. 117
Judge Swygert also would have applied Wilko v. Swan 18 to this
case. Although Wilko was a securities case, Judge Swygert found that
"a major underpinning of the Court's holding was.. . the vulnerabil-
ity of an individual investor to being manipulated by insiders in the
securities industry."1 9 Judge Swygert further thought that Weissbuch
v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.120 controlled the case at
bar. In Weissbuch, a securities fraud case, the Seventh Circuit refused
to enforce an arbitration clause "because it was not the product of ac-
tual bargaining between the parties and enforcement would determine
the policy contained in the Securities Exchange Act121 of protecting the
114. 565 F.2d at 1204 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
115. 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 6o (1976).
116. 565 F.2d at 1204 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1205-06.
118. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
119. 565 F.2d at 1206 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435
(1953)).
120. 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977).
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976).
COMMODITIES LAW
individual investor."' 22 Judge Swygert saw no logical distinction
between Weissbuch and Tamari. He would have applied Weissbuch to
Tamari, stating:
There is no logical way to distinguish the plight of the individual
securities investor and the individual commodities investor. Both are
vulnerable to fraudulent schemes perpetrated by industry insiders.
Congressional concern for the individual investor is no greater in the
Securities Exchange Act than it is in the Commodity Exchange Act.
Finally, the danger that arbitration will frustrate the intent of Con-
gress is no greater in the securities industry than it is in the commodi-
ties industry.
123
Judge Swygert's dissent is even more compelling when one consid-
ers the CFTC's current policy regarding arbitration agreements. As
early as 1975 the CFTC recognized the unfairness of allowing brokers
to utilize adhesion contracts to compel arbitration of customer dis-
putes.' 24 The CFTC has since promulgated a rule which generally pro-
hibits arbitration clauses in contracts to open accounts. 25 The tenor of
the CFTC rule is exemplified by the requirement that the customer
agreement must contain the following cautionary language printed in
bold face type:
WHILE THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMIS-
SION (CFTC) RECOGNIZES THE BENEFITS OF SETTLING
DISPUTES BY ARBITRATION, IT REQUIRES THAT YOUR
CONSENT TO SUCH AN AGREEMENT BE VOLUNTARY.
YOU NEED NOT SIGN THIS AGREEMENT TO OPEN AN AC-
COUNT WITH [name]. See 17 CFR 180.1-180.6.
BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, YOU MAY BE WAIVING
YOUR RIGHT TO SUE IN A COURT OF LAW, BUT YOU ARE
NOT WAIVING YOUR RIGHT TO ELECT AT A LATER DATE
TO PROCEED PURSUANT TO SECTION 14 OF THE COM-
MODITY EXCHANGE ACT TO SEEK DAMAGES SUS-
TAINED AS A RESULT OF A VIOLATION OF THE ACT. IN
THE EVENT A DISPUTE ARISES, YOU WILL BE NOTIFIED
IF [name] INTENDS TO SUBMIT THE DISPUTE TO ARBITRA-
TION. IF YOU BELIEVE A VIOLATION OF THE COMMOD-
ITY EXCHANGE ACT IS INVOLVED AND IF YOU PREFER
TO REQUEST A SECTION 14 "REPARATIONS" PROCEED-
ING BEFORE THE CFTC, YOU WILL STILL HAVE 45 DAYS
IN WHICH TO MAKE THAT ELECTION. 126
In light of these regulatory changes vis-a-vis arbitration and the
availability of a CFTC sponsored reparations forum, it would appear
122. 565 F.2d at 1206 (Swygert, J., dissenting) (citing Weissbuch v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977)).
123. 565 F.2d at 1206 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
124. [1975-77 Transfer Binder] COMM. Fur. L. REP. (CCH) 20,111 (Nov. 24, 1975).
125. Arbitration or Other Dispute Settlement Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 180.3(a) (1977).
126. Id. § 180.3(b)(4).
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that controversies such as Tamari v. Bache will not be so prevalent in
the future.
The second case, Tamari v. Conrad,27 arose from the continuation
of the arbitration proceedings. During the course of the ensuing arbi-
tration proceedings it appeared to the Tamaris that the arbitration
panel had failed to abide by the submission agreement, the rules and
regulations of the CBOT and the law with regard to the selection and
empanelling of the arbitration panel. Upon the refusal of the panel to
disqualify itself, the Tamaris filed the subject declaratory judgment ac-
tion in the district court against the members of the CBOT arbitration
committee seeking an injunction which would provide for their dis-
qualification. 28 The district court dismissed the action, holding that
the Tamaris had to proceed with the pending arbitration and exhaust
all avenues of administrative appeal before they could return to the
district court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit again affirmed the decision of the district court.
29
This suit against the arbitrators presented a case of first impression
to the Seventh Circuit on the question of whether arbitrators can be
sued with respect to their authority to resolve a dispute. 130 The
Tamaris emphasized that their complaint did not challenge any of the
arbitrators' actions in the conduct of the hearings, but rather their ca-
pacity to resolve the dispute. It was further contended that the defend-
ant arbitrators could not rely on arbitral immunity' 3' if they had no
right to arbitrate the dispute in the first place.
The decision defeating the Tamaris' contentions is straightforward
and based on recognized tenets of public policy. In brief the court held
that:
[A]rbitral immunity should be extended to cases where the authority
of an arbitrator to resolve a dispute is challenged. Defendants are
individuals who are familiar with the commodities futures business.
They agreed to serve as arbitrators, at nominal pay, at the request of
the Chicago Board of Trade. It is obviously in the best interests of
both the brokers who utilize the Chicago Board of Trade and their
customers to have arbitration facilities available. But individuals
such as defendants cannot be expected to volunteer to arbitrate dis-
putes if they can be caught up in the struggle between the litigants
and saddled with the burdens of defending a lawsuit. Defendants
have no interest in the outcome of the dispute between Tamari and
127. 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cit. 1977).
128. Id. at 780.
129. Id. at 781.
130. Id. at 780.
131. See Cahn v. International Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d 113, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1962)
(per curiam); Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
COMMODITIES LAW
Bache, and they should not be compelled to become parties to that
dispute. 1
32
Thus, it appears that unless it can be demonstrated that the arbitrators
have an interest in the outcome of the dispute they are totally immune
from suit.
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE BARS COLLATERAL ATTACK ON
REPARATIONS PROCEEDINGS
Collateral attacks, including those based on constitutional
grounds, are barred almost without exception 33 by the requirement
that the complaining party exhaust his administrative remedies.' 34 The
Seventh Circuit's most recent decision in Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley,
35
certainly endorses application of the exhaustion doctrine even where
approximately twenty-five suits might be avoided by permitting collat-
eral consideration of the constitutional question. A concise opinion by
Judge Tone sets forth the Seventh Circuit's adherence, if not commit-
ment, to the doctrine and its liberal application.
The gravamen of the Rosenthal collateral attack challenged the
constitutionality of section 14 of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission Act of 1974.136 Section 14 confers on the CFTC the au-
thority to establish a reparations forum in which to hear and adjudicate
customer claims against futures commission merchants (i e., commodi-
ties brokers) and certain other registered persons. If, as a result of repa-
rations proceedings, 37 the CFTC finds a violation of the Commodity
Exchange Act, 38 the CFTC may award damages enforceable in a fed-
eral district court.' 39 Direct review of the CFTC's order is available in
the United States Court of Appeals.' 4°
Rosenthal & Company brought the injunction action because they
were then defending approximately twenty-five of these reparation pro-
ceedings. They sought to enjoin the CFTC and the five members of the
Commission from hearing the claims. The complaint alleged that the
statutory scheme concerning reparations violated the seventh amend-
132. 552 F.2d at 780, 781.
133. There are exceptions. See, e.g., Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 357 U.S.
77, 89 (1958); Public Utils. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958).
134. This is commonly referred to as the exhaustion doctrine. See Frey v. Commodity Exch.
Auth., 547 F.2d 46, 49-50 (7th Cir. 1976).
135. 581 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1978).
136. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
137. 17 C.F.R. §§ 12.1-12.102 (1977).
138. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976).
139. Id. § 18(f).
140. Id. § 18(g).
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mentl4 l by denying the right to a jury trial in civil cases.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, rely-
ing largely upon two of its recent decisions, Frey v. Commodity Ex-
change Authority,142 and Squillacote v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 43 stated, "We find no principled basis for distinguishing
Teamsters I or Frey from the case at bar. Essentially the same kind of
ultimate review of a final agency order by the court of appeals is pro-
vided for in the basic statutes involved in the three cases. . .. "144
Frey was a collateral action seeking to stay administrative pro-
ceedings unless and until discovery was afforded. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the exhaustion doctrine 45 and held that the
district court erroneously enjoined the administrative proceeding pend-
ing discovery. The Seventh Circuit considered the injunction to be a
premature interruption of the administrative process. 146 Speaking for
the court, Chief Judge Fairchild found no due process violation in the
CFTC action because the administrative proceedings had not yet ad-
vanced to the hearing stage when the injunction was issued. 147
Similarly, in Teamsters 1, the court refused to collaterally consider
the constitutionality of a provision of the underlying statute on which
the legality of the Teamsters' conduct depended because the Teamsters
"had not shown a clear violation of a constitutional right or that its
constitutional claim could not be judicially determined if an exception
to the exhaustion requirement were not allowed."' 48
The Rosenthal court also weighed the efficiency of determining the
constitutional question immediately against the countervailing consid-
eration of not interfering with the agency's performance and the possi-
bility that an agency determination in favor of Rosenthal would
operate to moot the constitutional question. The court concluded that
141. The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by ury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
142. 547 F.2d 46, 49-50 (7th Cir. 1976).
143. 561 F.2d 31, 37-40 (7th Cir. 1977). This case will hereinafter be referred to as Teamsters
I. In Inernational Bhd of Teamsters v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978) (Teamsters II), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided the constitutional question in a
direct review of the NLRB's final order.
144. 581 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1978).
145. For a definition of the exhaustion doctrine, see text accompanying note 134 supra.
146. 547 F.2d at 47.
147. Id. at 49.
148. 581 F.2d at 1260.
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the latter considerations had greater weight. 149
Finally, the court observed that Rosenthal & Company had not
demonstrated that it merited the "clear-right" exception to the applica-
tion of the exhaustion doctrine. 50 The court viewed Rosenthal &
Company's seventh amendment claim as "arguable but far from
clear."' 51 In sum, it is clear from Rosenthal, Frey, and Teamsters I that
the Seventh Circuit will not allow collateral attacks on CFTC proceed-
ings unless a violation of a constitutional "clear right" can be estab-
lished.
CONCLUSION
In rendering five significant commodities law decisions during the
1977-78 term, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit conveyed two distinct messages. First, the federal securities laws
will not be considered a source of relief for disputes arising from com-
modity futures trading accounts. Second, the court will defer consider-
ably to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission on matters
within the Commission's jurisdiction.
In reviewing the court's decisions it becomes apparent that the
court did not always further the policy behind the federal commodities
laws, ie., protection of the investor. 52 This is an unfortunate result,
not only for the individual commodities investor but also for the com-
modities futures trading industry as a whole.
149. Id. at 1261.
150. Id. Under the "clear-right" exception doctrine, the court will intervene when necessary
to avoid an agency violation of a clear statutory, constitutional, or regulatory right belonging to
one of the parties. Id.
151. Id.
152. S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5843, 5856.

